In their book Der MBTI. Die 16 Grundmuster unseres Verhaltens nach C. G. Jung. Eine dynamische Persönlichkeitstypologie, Richard Bents and Reiner Blank present a view of the development of psychological functions that is widespread within the MBTI tradition. According to this conception, the functions differentiate gradually and sequentially over the course of a person’s life: first the dominant function, then the secondary, followed by the tertiary and, finally, the inferior function.
This picture appears plausible and fits well with our ordinary idea of human development: a child possesses a relatively undifferentiated psyche; later, the child’s abilities gradually take shape, become specialized and improve; and maturity involves increasingly flexible use of psychological capacities that had previously remained undeveloped.
However, two different questions are being combined here:
In what order do the psychological functions operate — and in what order do they arise or become differentiated over the course of a person’s life?
The order of the functions in itself tells us nothing about their ontogeny.
The model of consciousness proposed here retains the sequence of functions underlying Jungian typology and the MBTI but interprets it in an entirely different way. The functions do not differentiate one after another at different stages of life. Their structural state arises much earlier and does not subsequently change.
Let us examine the two conceptions in more detail.
Function as a Preference Developed Through Practice
Bents and Blank begin their explanation with a readily understandable analogy. Most people have a preferred hand. When a person picks up a pencil, they do not normally choose at random between the right and left hand but automatically use the hand with which they are accustomed to writing.
The authors suggest that something similar happens with psychological functions.
A person prefers a particular function and therefore uses it more often. Through constant practice, they become increasingly proficient in using it. The function becomes more controlled and reliable, and the person develops an increasingly precise sense of where and how it can best be applied. Successful use of the function, in turn, encourages its still more frequent use.
A positive feedback loop emerges:
preference → practice → greater proficiency → still more frequent use.
At the same time, the opposite function receives less practice. According to this view, a child who prefers sensation exercises intuition less; a child who prefers intuition correspondingly exercises sensation less.
One function therefore gradually differentiates, while its opposite remains relatively undifferentiated.
In this account, several concepts are effectively linked into a single sequence:
preference → use → practice → development → differentiation.
The more a function is used and developed, the more differentiated it becomes.
But is the differentiation of a function really the result of practice?
The Sequential Development of the Four Functions
Bents and Blank then describe not merely the distinction between the preferred and the opposite function, but an assumed sequence in the development of all four functions.
According to them, the differentiation of the personality functions probably does not begin, in most cases, before adolescence. During adolescence, the dominant function is the first to be formed. During the transition to adulthood, the secondary function develops. In early adulthood, attention turns to the tertiary function. In midlife or later, the inferior function is finally discovered and developed.
The resulting sequence is:
preferred (dominant) → secondary → tertiary → inferior.
In mature adulthood, a person may ideally achieve a certain flexibility in the use of all four functions.
The authors incorporate this sequence into a broader conception of individuation. Referring to Jung, they describe the course of life as a movement from the child’s initial state of “unconscious perfection” through the imperfection of adult life towards the conscious wholeness of the mature person.
Development may be accompanied by crises. Suppressed or insufficiently developed functions begin to make themselves felt, sometimes quite forcefully. A person must gradually establish a relationship with them and incorporate them into psychological life.
However, we should pay attention to the epistemic status of this account.
Description or Hypothesis?
Bents and Blank cautiously use the word wahrscheinlich — “probably” — once, when they state that the differentiation of the functions generally does not begin before adolescence.
The subsequent sequence, however, is presented largely as a description of what happens: first the dominant function is formed, then the secondary, later the tertiary, and finally the inferior function.
The authors refer to Jung and later also quote Martin Buber, but they do not provide a separate justification for why the order of the functions should simultaneously constitute the chronological order of their differentiation.
Yet these are not the same claim.
The fact that four functions occupy particular positions in relation to one another does not in itself imply that they must arise or become differentiated sequentially at corresponding stages of life.
To establish such an age-related sequence empirically, one would first have to define the observable criteria by which we could determine that a particular function in a child is still undifferentiated and later becomes differentiated. Research would then be required to trace this change over the course of development.
No such evidence is presented in the account under discussion.
The sequential development of the functions should therefore be regarded as a theoretical hypothesis, regardless of whether the authors themselves explicitly label it as such.
The model proposed below is likewise a hypothesis. But it begins with an entirely different understanding of differentiation.
What Does the Differentiation of a Function Mean?
In our model, differentiation is not a degree of development of a function.
A function cannot be said to be slightly differentiated at first, then to become increasingly differentiated through practice, and finally to attain a high degree of differentiation.
A function exists in one of two structural states:
it is either differentiated or undifferentiated.
The state of differentiation of a function does not change.
This is a fundamental difference from the conception presented by Bents and Blank.
For this reason, we try to avoid speaking of the “development of a function” altogether. For such an expression to have a theoretical meaning, we would first have to define precisely what it is that develops.
A person develops, acquires knowledge and skills, masters language, learns highly complex forms of activity and accumulates experience. The content of the psyche changes continuously.
But none of this necessarily means that the psychological functions themselves develop.
In the proposed model, psychological functions are ways of generating psychic content. This conception, together with the dichotomies that follow from it, is discussed in detail in the article The Psyche, the Subject, and Psychic Reality. There the psyche is defined as a system for generating psychic content, while the subject and the environment constitute the fundamental dichotomy of psychic reality.
For our present purposes, it is sufficient to note that with the emergence of the psyche, fundamental distinctions arise simultaneously:
subject — environment;
consciousness — unconscious;
sensation — intuition;
thinking — feeling.
Consciousness and the unconscious are not themselves separate functions: any of the four functions may be conscious or unconscious.
We are therefore dealing not with the gradual emergence of separate elements but with the emergence of a structure.
When Do the Four Functions Arise?
If the functions do not differentiate sequentially during adolescence and adulthood, a natural question follows: when do they arise?
We assume that all four functions arise soon after birth.
The extraordinarily rapid psychological development of the young child provides an argument in favour of this hypothesis.
Already during the first years of life, a child perceives and distinguishes the properties of concrete objects, acquires an enormous amount of knowledge, masters language, recognizes possibilities for using particular objects and situations, establishes relationships with other people, and orients themselves towards what is desirable or undesirable for them.
In other words, long before adolescence, we can observe in the child’s psychic life content corresponding to all four of Jung’s functions — sensation, intuition, thinking and feeling.
It is difficult to explain such rapid mastery of reality if we assume that these functions do not yet exist as differentiated functions.
Of course, a young child does not possess the knowledge of an adult and cannot do what an adult can do. But a lack of knowledge and skills should not be equated with a lack of differentiation of a psychological function.
The child learns.
It does not follow that with every new piece of knowledge or every newly acquired skill, the function that makes the corresponding psychic content possible is itself developing.
The Right Path as the Initial State
At this point another distinction in the proposed model becomes relevant: the distinction between the right and left paths of consciousness.
On the right path, all four functions are differentiated.
On the left path, only the dominant function is differentiated. The other three functions are undifferentiated and fused with one another.
This distinction is particularly important because it allows us to pose differently the question of the difficulties that Bents and Blank associate with insufficiently developed functions.
On the right path, consciousness has four differentiated functions at its disposal. Each of them is capable of generating the content corresponding to it without becoming fused with the content of its opposite function.
On the left path, the situation is fundamentally different. Three of the four functions are undifferentiated. Opposite functions are fused and therefore cannot provide orientation in the way differentiated functions can.
The problem, therefore, is not that a person has failed to “train” a particular function sufficiently.
The problem is structural.
The Child’s “Unconscious Perfection”
In this context, the conception attributed by Bents and Blank to Jung — that human beings begin life in a state of unbewusste Vollkommenheit, unconscious perfection or unconscious wholeness — becomes particularly interesting.
It can be interpreted differently from the way the authors interpret it.
The child’s unconscious perfection may correspond to the right path of consciousness, on which all four functions are differentiated.
Here, however, “unconscious” does not mean that the functions themselves or the structure of the psyche must gradually become contents of consciousness. A person does not directly perceive their own psychological functions or their structural relations, either in childhood or in adulthood.
What a person encounters is the content generated by the functions.
The functions themselves and the relations between them can only be reconstructed theoretically.
The unconsciousness of a structure and the undifferentiated state of a function are therefore two entirely different things.
Can a Person Remain on the Right Path?
The right path is not a developmental stage that a person must eventually outgrow.
A person can remain on the right path.
The content generated by the functions changes throughout life. A child acquires knowledge, experience and skills; new relationships, tasks, interests and forms of activity arise.
The direction of attention may remain unchanged.
But it may also change.
This is where the proposed mechanism of transition to the left path becomes relevant.
Attention and the Function Opposite the Auxiliary Function
It is particularly interesting to compare the proposed model with the terminology used by Bents and Blank.
On the right path, the functions operate in the following temporal sequence:
dominant → auxiliary → sixth → third.
These positions correspond to the functions that Bents and Blank call:
preferred (dominant) → secondary → tertiary → inferior.
The correspondence itself does not confirm the proposed model: this sequence was built into the construction of the model axiomatically.
What matters is something else.
The same order receives an entirely different interpretation.
Bents and Blank turn it into a sequence of functional development over the course of a human life.
In the proposed model, it is the temporal sequence in which already differentiated functions operate on the right path.
Consequently, the sequence
dominant → secondary → tertiary → inferior
does not in itself imply the sequence
adolescence → transition to adulthood → early adulthood → midlife.
Such a conclusion requires an additional hypothesis concerning the ontogeny of the functions.
The Tertiary Function and the Transition to the Left Path
The function that Bents and Blank call tertiary is of particular significance.
In our model, it corresponds to the function opposite the auxiliary function.
On the right path, attention follows the content of the auxiliary function. Sustaining attention on the content of the function opposite to it requires an effort of will — external constraint or self-constraint.
A young child is not yet capable of sustained voluntary self-constraint of this kind. The right path is therefore the initial state.
Later, the situation may change. External constraint, or self-constraint formed on its basis, may cause a person to sustain attention on the content of the function opposite the auxiliary function.
This shifts consciousness onto the left path.
Thus, the recommendation to develop or integrate the tertiary function, which is natural within a model of sequential functional development, acquires an entirely different meaning in the proposed model.
The question is not how proficiently a person has learned to use this function, but on the content of which function attention is being sustained and to what organization of consciousness this leads.
Why Difficulties Arise on the Left Path
Bents and Blank explain difficulties in terms of insufficient development or suppression of functions. They use the vivid image of a dog that is kept chained, insufficiently fed and prevented from running around and playing with other dogs. It is hardly surprising if an otherwise normal animal becomes aggressive under such conditions.
Similarly, in their account, a function that has long been suppressed may begin to manifest itself in uncontrolled and disruptive ways.
The proposed model offers a different explanation.
An undifferentiated function is not a fully differentiated function that has simply been given too little opportunity to express itself.
On the left path, three of the four functions are undifferentiated and fused with one another.
This is precisely why difficulties of orientation arise.
A differentiated function is capable of generating the content of its own type separately from its opposite function. In the undifferentiated state, this separation is absent.
Consequently, directing more attention towards an undifferentiated function does not in itself solve the problem. It does not turn the function into a differentiated one, because in the model the state of differentiation of a function does not change.
Moreover, if attention is sustained by an effort of will on the content of the function opposite the auxiliary function, this does not lead to its gradual integration. It is precisely this sustaining of attention that shifts consciousness onto the left path.
Does the Tertiary Function Need to Be Integrated?
From the perspective of the proposed model, the idea that the tertiary and later the inferior function must be successively integrated therefore becomes particularly questionable.
In the model presented by Bents and Blank, this is a natural continuation of personality development.
First, a person achieves a high degree of differentiation of the dominant function. The dominant and secondary functions then form a stable pair. Later, this organization no longer seems sufficient, and the difficult process of turning towards the tertiary function begins.
The conflict between the secondary and tertiary functions is interpreted as a stage in the movement towards greater wholeness.
In the proposed model, the same process receives the opposite explanation.
The tertiary function of Bents and Blank corresponds to the function opposite the auxiliary. Sustaining attention on its content is not a necessary stage in the maturation of personality. It shifts consciousness onto the left path.
The difficulties that arise during such a transition therefore need not be explained as the resistance of an insufficiently developed function to its necessary integration.
They arise because, on the left path, three functions are undifferentiated.
Individuation and Crisis
This also requires us to reconsider the process of individuation described by Bents and Blank.
The authors associate the movement towards wholeness with crises. The person’s habitual organization of personality ceases to be sufficient. Functions that had previously been neglected begin to make themselves felt. Their integration is painful, but through it the personality gradually becomes more complete.
Another interpretation is possible.
The crises accompanying this process are associated with the left path of consciousness.
If the initial state is the right path, on which all four functions are differentiated, then the transition to a state in which three of them are undifferentiated and fused cannot be understood as a movement from incompleteness towards wholeness.
On the contrary, difficulties of orientation become a natural consequence of the structural state of the functions on the left path.
A paradoxical question then arises: might a process traditionally interpreted as a movement towards greater wholeness in fact be a process in which consciousness loses the possibility of differentiated orientation through three of its four functions?
This does not mean that crises in human life have only one cause. We are speaking exclusively about crises interpreted within the typological framework under discussion as consequences of confrontation with the tertiary and inferior functions.
From Unconscious Perfection to Conscious Wholeness?
We can now return to the idea of the child’s “unconscious perfection.”
In the conception presented by Bents and Blank, a peculiar arc emerges. The child begins in unconscious wholeness. Then, as individual functions differentiate, one-sidedness develops. Later, the mature person must regain wholeness — this time consciously.
If the right path is the initial state, this description can be understood differently.
The child may indeed exist in a state of a kind of original wholeness — not because the functions have not yet separated, but precisely because all four functions are differentiated and capable of providing orientation.
Undifferentiation and wholeness then cease to be synonymous.
Indeed, they become almost opposite concepts.
Differentiation does not destroy original wholeness. It is a condition of adequate orientation.
The undifferentiated state of three functions does not occur at the beginning of life as a condition that must later be overcome. It occurs on the left path of consciousness.
Two Models
The principal differences can be summarized as follows:
| Bents and Blank | Proposed Model |
|---|---|
| The child begins in a state of relative undifferentiation | The right path is the initial state |
| The functions differentiate sequentially | On the right path, all four functions are differentiated |
| Differentiation is a process of functional development | The state of differentiation of a function does not change |
| Functions that are not used remain undeveloped | On the left path, three functions are undifferentiated and fused with one another |
| The tertiary function must gradually be integrated | Sustaining attention on the function opposite the auxiliary shifts consciousness onto the left path |
| Crises accompany the movement towards greater wholeness | Crises are associated with the functioning of consciousness on the left path |
The difference between the two models is therefore considerably deeper than a disagreement about the supposed age at which particular functions develop.
One might imagine, for example, that Bents and Blank place the differentiation of the dominant function in adolescence whereas we merely move it back into early childhood.
But that would be incorrect.
The question is not when exactly each function develops.
We do not assume a sequential development of the functions at all.
What, Then, Changes Over the Course of Life?
There is obviously an enormous difference between the psyche of a newborn child and that of an adult.
The child masters language, acquires knowledge and skills, learns to act with objects, understand other people, establish relationships and orient themselves in new situations. The child’s psychic content becomes incomparably richer and more complex.
But none of this in itself gives us grounds for speaking of the development of the functions themselves.
If a function is a way of generating a particular kind of psychic content, an increase in the quantity and complexity of that content does not mean that the structural state of the function has changed.
The content generated by the functions changes, and the direction of attention towards that content may also change.
The word “may” is important here. It does not express uncertainty about whether a change in the direction of attention is possible. It means that such a change does not necessarily occur.
A person may remain on the right path.
In that case, the content of the psyche changes continuously over the course of life, but no transition to the left path takes place.
If, however, attention begins to be sustained by an effort of will on the content of the function opposite the auxiliary function, consciousness shifts onto the left path.
The right path, therefore, should not be understood as an early developmental stage that a person must eventually leave behind in order to achieve further development.
One Order — Two Entirely Different Interpretations
It is particularly revealing that the order of the functions in Bents and Blank and in the proposed model is essentially the same.
In Bents and Blank:
dominant → secondary → tertiary → inferior.
On the right path in the proposed model:
dominant → auxiliary → sixth → third.
The dominant function corresponds to the dominant function in Bents and Blank, the auxiliary to their secondary function, the sixth to their tertiary function, and the third to their inferior function.
This correspondence in itself proves nothing. The sequence of the functions was built into the proposed model axiomatically.
What is interesting is something else: the same order is given an entirely different temporal interpretation.
Bents and Blank distribute this sequence over the course of a human life. The dominant function differentiates first, followed by the secondary, then the tertiary and, finally, the inferior function.
In the proposed model, the same sequence describes not decades of human life but the temporal order in which already differentiated functions operate on the right path.
The order of the functions therefore does not in itself establish an order of their ontogenetic development.
To move from the statement
“these functions occupy these positions and operate in this order”
to the statement
“these functions differentiate sequentially in this order over the course of a human life”
requires an additional assumption.
Bents and Blank do not separately justify this transition.
What Does It Mean to “Develop a Function”?
This reveals another difficulty.
If we say that a function develops, we need to define what exactly we mean by its development.
An increase in knowledge?
The acquisition of skills?
The ability to solve increasingly complex problems?
Greater ease in using the function?
The ability to employ it consciously?
Its differentiation?
In Bents and Blank, these phenomena are closely linked. A preferred function is used more often, becomes more skilful and reliable through practice, and thereby becomes increasingly differentiated.
But the fact that a person becomes more proficient in a particular activity does not in itself imply that the structural state of a psychological function has changed.
This is why the proposed model avoids the concept of the “development of a function.”
We can speak of a child’s development, the acquisition of knowledge, mastery of language, learning, accumulation of experience and formation of skills. All of these are changes that can be observed.
But expressions such as “development of thinking,” “development of feeling,” “development of intuition” or “development of sensation” require an additional definition of what exactly has changed in the function.
Without such a definition, the word “development” may create an impression of explanation rather than actually explaining anything.
Differentiation Is Not Perfection
Another important distinction follows from this.
A differentiated function is not necessarily a perfect function.
Differentiation tells us nothing in itself about how much a person knows, their education, life experience, intelligence or social competence.
A young child may have differentiated thinking while knowing incomparably less than an adult.
The child may have differentiated intuition and still be mistaken about the possibilities offered by a situation.
The child may have differentiated feeling and still only be learning how to establish relationships with other people.
The child may have differentiated sensation without yet knowing the names of the objects and properties they perceive.
Differentiation does not mean perfection of performance. It means that a function is structurally separate from its opposite.
This is precisely why the rapid development of a young child does not require us to assume the rapid development of the functions themselves. On the contrary, it becomes easier to understand if the psychological functions required for orientation are already present.
Why Undifferentiated Functions Make Orientation Difficult
On the right path, all four functions are differentiated.
On the left path, the situation is fundamentally different: only the dominant function is differentiated, while the other three are undifferentiated and fused with one another.
The fusion of opposite functions is particularly important here.
When opposite functions are not differentiated, the content of one function cannot be separated from the content of the other in the way it can on the right path.
The three undifferentiated functions therefore cannot provide reliable orientation.
This allows us to interpret differently phenomena that, in the model of sequential development, are explained in terms of weakness, suppression or insufficient training of functions.
If a function is undifferentiated, the problem is not solved by using it more frequently.
Practice does not alter its structural state.
Moreover, sustaining attention by an effort of will on the content of the function opposite the auxiliary does not gradually integrate that function. It shifts consciousness onto the left path.
Does the Tertiary Function Need to Be Integrated?
From the perspective of the proposed model, the idea that the tertiary and later the inferior function must successively be integrated therefore becomes particularly questionable.
In the model presented by Bents and Blank, this is a natural continuation of personality development.
First, a person achieves a high degree of differentiation of the dominant function. Then the dominant and secondary functions form a stable pair. Later, this organization no longer appears sufficient, and the difficult process of turning towards the tertiary function begins.
The conflict between the secondary and tertiary functions is interpreted as a stage in the movement towards greater wholeness.
In the proposed model, the same process receives the opposite explanation.
The tertiary function in Bents and Blank corresponds to the function opposite the auxiliary. Sustaining attention on its content is not a necessary stage in the maturation of personality. It shifts consciousness onto the left path.
The difficulties that arise during such a transition therefore need not be explained as the resistance of an insufficiently developed function to its necessary integration.
They arise because, on the left path, three functions are undifferentiated.
Individuation and Crisis
This also requires us to reconsider the process of individuation described by Bents and Blank.
The authors associate the movement towards wholeness with crises. The person’s habitual organization of personality ceases to be sufficient. Functions that had previously been neglected begin to make themselves felt. Their integration is painful, but through it the personality gradually becomes more complete.
Another interpretation is possible.
The crises accompanying this process are associated with the left path of consciousness.
If the initial state is the right path, on which all four functions are differentiated, then a transition to a state in which three of them are undifferentiated and fused cannot be understood as a movement from incompleteness towards wholeness.
On the contrary, difficulties of orientation are a natural consequence of the structural state of the functions on the left path.
A paradoxical question then arises: might a process traditionally interpreted as a movement towards greater wholeness in fact be a process in which consciousness loses the possibility of differentiated orientation through three of its four functions?
This does not mean that crises in human life have only one cause. We are speaking exclusively about crises interpreted within the typological framework under discussion as consequences of confrontation with the tertiary and inferior functions.
From Unconscious Perfection to Conscious Wholeness?
We can now return to the idea of the child’s “unconscious perfection.”
In the conception presented by Bents and Blank, a peculiar arc emerges. The child begins in unconscious wholeness. Then, as individual functions differentiate, one-sidedness develops. Later, the mature person must regain wholeness — this time consciously.
If the right path is the initial state, this description can be understood differently.
The child may indeed exist in a state of a kind of original wholeness — not because the functions have not yet separated, but precisely because all four functions are differentiated and capable of providing orientation.
Undifferentiation and wholeness then cease to be synonymous.
Indeed, they become almost opposite concepts.
Differentiation does not destroy original wholeness. It is a condition of adequate orientation.
The undifferentiated state of three functions does not occur at the beginning of life as a condition that must later be overcome. It occurs on the left path of consciousness.
Two Different Pictures of Human Development
In the end, we are faced with two substantially different pictures.
The first presents human life as a gradual differentiation of psychological functions. Initially, the functions are relatively undifferentiated. One of them then gains precedence, is practised and develops. Later, other functions join it. Movement towards maturity requires the development and integration of increasingly less preferred functions, while the crises that arise in this process form part of individuation.
The second picture assumes that the structure arises much earlier.
All four functions are already present in early childhood. On the right path, they are differentiated. Their state of differentiation does not change as a result of practice, learning or growing older.
The child develops — but it does not follow that the functions develop.
The content of the psyche changes. New knowledge, relationships, skills and forms of activity arise. A person masters language and culture, receives an education and acquires professional and life experience.
A person may remain on the right path.
But the direction of attention may change. If attention begins to be sustained on the content of the function opposite the auxiliary, consciousness shifts onto the left path. On the left path, only the dominant function remains differentiated, while the other three are undifferentiated and fused.
The distinction between the right and left paths therefore cannot be understood as a distinction between an earlier and a later stage of development.
They are two different states of the organization of consciousness.
Conclusion
The idea of the sequential development of the four functions fits so naturally into our general conception of growing up that it is easy to accept it without asking an additional question:
What exactly is developing here?
A human being undoubtedly develops.
But it does not follow that the psychological functions develop.
A child acquires knowledge, masters language, learns to use objects and perceive the possibilities offered by situations, establishes relationships with other people, and distinguishes between what is desirable and undesirable. All of this happens long before adolescence, which Bents and Blank identify as the period when the differentiation of the functions begins.
We can therefore propose a different explanation: the four functions do not arise sequentially through practice but are present much earlier as elements of an already existing structure of the psyche.
In that case, we must distinguish between the content generated by a function and the structural state of the function.
The content changes continuously.
The state of differentiation does not.
The traditional sequence
dominant → secondary → tertiary → inferior
can then be understood in an entirely different way.
It need not describe decades of human life.
On the right path, it corresponds to the sequence
dominant → auxiliary → sixth → third,
that is, to the temporal sequence in which already differentiated functions operate.
The same order therefore permits two different interpretations.
The question is no longer:
At what age does each function develop?
It is a more fundamental one:
Do psychological functions develop at all — or is it the human being who develops, while the psyche possesses a particular structure from the beginning?